Technology Transfer Agreement Eu

(67) In the context of an agreement which is not an exclusive agreement from a technical point of view and, therefore, if a termination clause is not covered by the safe wearing of GMOs TT, the licensor may, in a given case, find itself in a situation of similar dependence on a licensee with considerable demand power. This dependence is taken into account in the individual assessment. This Section does not deal with obligations in licensing agreements which, as a general rule, do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) of the EC Treaty. Those obligations include, inter alia, that categories of technology transfer agreements fulfilling the conditions laid down in GMO TT are exempted from the prohibition rule laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. Exemption agreements are legally valid and enforceable. These agreements can only be banned for the future and only after the withdrawal of the block exemption by the Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States. Exemption agreements may not be prohibited by national courts in private litigation under Article 101. A clause requiring the licensee not to contest ownership of the rights in the technology does not generally constitute a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1). Whether or not the licensor owns the technological rights, the use of the technology by the licensee and any other party is in any event subject to obtaining a licence and competition would therefore generally not be affected (65). An important change has been introduced with regard to the dispute and termination clauses. These play an important role in all license agreements.

It is generally in the interest of the policyholder to retain the right to challenge the validity of the protection (e.g. B of a patent). If the patent is cancelled, this usually results in an exemption from the obligation to pay royalties. The assessment of certain restrictions may require consideration of other factors. These factors include cumulative effects, i.e. market coverage by similar agreements, the duration of agreements, the regulatory environment and practices that may signal or facilitate cartels, such as price leadership, pre-announced price changes and discussions about the “correct” price, price rigidity in response to overcapacity, price discrimination and previous collusion behaviour. . . .